Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects
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References listed on IDEAS
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Granot, Daniel & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1991. "The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 163-182, May.
- Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 143-156.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997. "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998.
- Ravi Bapna & Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Sarah Rice, 2010. "Vertically Differentiated Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(7), pages 1074-1092, July.
- Wiroy Shin, 2013. "Simultaneous auctions for complementary goods," Papers 1312.2641, arXiv.org.
- Elmaghraby, Wedad J., 2005. "Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: Issues of efficiency in electricity auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 166(2), pages 430-448, October.
- Wittwer, Milena, 2017. "Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result," MPRA Paper 76534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 55-58.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
- Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David & Erkoc, Murat, 2006. "Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 816-834, October.
- Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2017. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Preprints 171995, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
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