Editor's Choice The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response
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- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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