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Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?

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  • Kim Nguyen
  • Michael Peters
  • Michel Poitevin

Abstract

We analyze the academic matching market by considering a simple model in which applicants who face an application cost strategically choose portfolios of applications. Universities then play a decentralized offer game in which unaccepted offers result in failure to trade on both sides of the market. We characterize a basic equilibrium to illustrate the sorting role that application costs play. In a numeric example, we illustrate how reduced application costs can result in increased matching frictions. Est‐ce qu’une foire des emplois pour les économistes pourrait aider les universités canadiennes? On analyse l’arrimage sur le marché académique des économistes en considérant un modèle simple dans lequel ceux qui font face à un coût d’application pour un poste choisissent stratégiquement des portefeuilles d’applications. Les universités jouent alors un jeu de l’offre décentralisée dans lequel les offres non‐acceptées résultent en une défaillance de l’échange des deux côtés du marché. On caractérise un équilibre de base pour illustrer le rôle d’allocation que jouent les coûts d’application. Un exemple numérique illustre comment des coûts d’application réduits peuvent engendrer des frictions d’arrimage accrues.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Nguyen & Michael Peters & Michel Poitevin, 2017. "Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1573-1594, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:50:y:2017:i:5:p:1573-1594
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hector Chade & Gregory Lewis & Lones Smith, 2014. "Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 971-1002.
    2. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1342-1352, December.
    3. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2001. "Unraveling Reduces the Scope of an Entry Level Labor Market: Gastroenterology With and Without a Centralized Match," NBER Working Papers 8616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
    5. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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