IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02059282.html

Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Pierre Dargnies

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rustamdjan Hakimov

    (WZB - Social Science Research Center Berlin - Social Science Research Center Berlin)

  • Dorothea Kübler

    (WZB - Social Science Research Center Berlin - Social Science Research Center Berlin)

Abstract

We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. We give participants the option to accept early offers when information about their performance has not been revealed, or to wait for the assortative matching based on their actual relative performance. Early offers are accepted more often when the task is hard than when it is easy. We show that the treatment effect works through a shift in beliefs,i.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant of unraveling, namely biased self-assessments, which can lead to penalties for underconfident individuals as well as efficiency losses.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Pierre Dargnies & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2019. "Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets," Post-Print hal-02059282, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02059282
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3201
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Comola, Margherita & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2018. "An experimental study on decentralized networked markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 567-591.
    2. Thomas (T.) Buser & Noemi Peter & Stefan Wolter, 2017. "Gender, Willingness to Compete and Career Choices Along the Whole Ability Distribution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-081/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe Tergiman, 2024. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 1-42, August.
    4. Bó, Inácio & Chen, Li & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2024. "Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 487-516.
    5. Barron, Kai & Gravert, Christina, 2018. "Beliefs and actions: How a shift in confidence affects choices," MPRA Paper 84743, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Pan, Siqi, 2019. "The instability of matching with overconfident agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 396-415.
    7. Dargnies, Marie-Pierre & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2022. "Aversion to hiring algorithms: Transparency, gender profiling, and self-confidence," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Barron, Kai & Gravert, Christina, 2022. "Confidence and career choices: an experiment," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 124(1), pages 35-68.
    9. Erkal, Nisvan & Gangadharan, Lata & Koh, Boon Han, 2020. "Replication: Belief elicitation with quadratic and binarized scoring rules," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Katharina Dowling & Lucas Stich & Martin Spann, 2021. "An experimental analysis of overconfidence in tariff choice," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2275-2297, November.
    11. Thomas Buser & Noemi Peter & Stefan C. Wolter, 2022. "Willingness to compete, gender and career choices along the whole ability distribution," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1299-1326, November.
    12. Adrian Bruhin & Fidel Petros & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2024. "The role of self-confidence in teamwork: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 687-712, July.
    13. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
    14. Vincent Meisner, 2023. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2733-2745, May.
    15. Müge Süer & Michel Tolksdorf & Vincent Meisner & Sokol Tominaj, 2025. "Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 546, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    16. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3694-3713, June.
    17. David Danz & Lise Vesterlund & Alistair J. Wilson, 2020. "Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives," NBER Working Papers 27327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02059282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.