Continuity of the First Price Auction Nash Equilibrium Correspondance
Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some particular probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.
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| Date of creation: | 1999 |
| Handle: | RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9922 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Pavillon J.A. De Sève, Québec, Québec, G1K 7P4 Phone: (418) 656-5122 Fax: (418) 656-2707 Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca Email: More information through EDIRC
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