Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence
Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: July 27, 2001|
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