IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v25y2025i1p99-118n1007.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations

Author

Listed:
  • Ceesay Muhammed

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Firenze, Via delle Pandette 32, I-50127 Firenze, Italy)

  • Doni Nicola

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Firenze, Via delle Pandette 32, I-50127 Firenze, Italy)

  • Menicucci Domenico

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Firenze, Via delle Pandette 32, I-50127 Firenze, Italy)

Abstract

We examine a two-bidder auction setting in which the distributions for the bidders’ valuations are asymmetric over a support consisting of three elements. For the first price auction, for each parameter values we derive the unique Bayes Nash Equilibrium in closed form. We rely on this result to compare the revenue in the first price auction with the revenue in the second price auction. The latter is often revenue superior to the former, and we determine precisely, given a distribution for the value of a bidder, when a distribution for the value of the other bidder exists such that the first price auction is superior to the second price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Ceesay Muhammed & Doni Nicola & Menicucci Domenico, 2025. "Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 25(1), pages 99-118.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:25:y:2025:i:1:p:99-118:n:1007
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0109
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejte-2024-0109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric auctions; first price auction; second price auction; revenue ranking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:25:y:2025:i:1:p:99-118:n:1007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.