Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
We show by an example that in first-price IPV auctions, asymmetry in bidders' valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus. Asymmetry need not reduce competition in first-price auctions.
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