A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions
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- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp291, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cantillon, Estelle, 2008.
"The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1279, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9001, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cheng, Harrison, 2006. "Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4-5), pages 471-498, August.
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:14:y:2012:i:03:n:s0219198912500193 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 78-80, April.
More about this item
KeywordsAsymmetric Auctions; Asymmetric Beliefs; Affiliation; Linkage Principle;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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