Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems
We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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