The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions
We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given his beliefs. We define the effectivess of an auction as the ration between the expected revenue it generated for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation (total surplus).
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|Date of creation:||May 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.|
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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