Preferred Bidders' Curse in a Simultaneous Ascending Auction with a Case Study on an Australian Broadband Spectrum Auction
In this paper we try shedding light on the two popular questions on spectrum licensing auctions:  whether any geographical synergies between licences can be detected, and if so, what would be possible alternatives and pros and cons thereof, and  whether the provision of entrants-only licences truly serve to protect new (hence less established) entrants and encourage their participation. Our empirical analysis on  is mixed and inconclusive, leaving some concerns on the broadly adopted auction mechanism that ignores any potential synergistic interlink between geographically adjacent licences. The Australian data also serves to cast a fresh doubt against , which we follow up by a simple theoretical discussion.
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