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Preferred Bidders' Curse in a Simultaneous Ascending Auction with a Case Study on an Australian Broadband Spectrum Auction


  • Romsas, T.
  • Sasaki, D.


In this paper we try shedding light on the two popular questions on spectrum licensing auctions: [1] whether any geographical synergies between licences can be detected, and if so, what would be possible alternatives and pros and cons thereof, and [2] whether the provision of entrants-only licences truly serve to protect new (hence less established) entrants and encourage their participation. Our empirical analysis on [1] is mixed and inconclusive, leaving some concerns on the broadly adopted auction mechanism that ignores any potential synergistic interlink between geographically adjacent licences. The Australian data also serves to cast a fresh doubt against [2], which we follow up by a simple theoretical discussion.

Suggested Citation

  • Romsas, T. & Sasaki, D., 2000. "Preferred Bidders' Curse in a Simultaneous Ascending Auction with a Case Study on an Australian Broadband Spectrum Auction," Discussion Papers 0016, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:0016

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications


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