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A Theory of Indicative Bidding

Author

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  • Daniel Quint
  • Kenneth Hendricks

Abstract

When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids—nonbinding preliminary bids—to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders "pooling" over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value bidders are not always selected. When the number of potential bidders is large, revenue and total surplus are both higher than when entry is unrestricted.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Quint & Kenneth Hendricks, 2018. "A Theory of Indicative Bidding," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 118-151, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:10:y:2018:i:2:p:118-51
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160290
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Ebina, Takeshi & Kumakura, Yuya & Nishide, Katsumasa, 2022. "Hostile takeovers or friendly mergers? Real options analysis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    3. Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023. "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1329-1362, November.
    4. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2019. "Dual sourcing with price discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 225-246.
    5. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    6. Sander Onderstal & Yang Yang, 2020. "Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions: Theory and Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-013/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Deltas, George & Evenett, Simon, 2020. "Language as a barrier to entry: Foreign competition in Georgian public procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 0. "Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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