IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/12567.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Procurement Centralization in the EU: the Case of Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Decarolis, Francesco

Abstract

This paper analyzes the process of centralization of public procurement in Europe, with an emphasis on the Italian case. It illustrates the main normative and regulatory reforms that took place between 2000 and 2016 at both EU and Italian levels. It then empirically evaluates the potential distortions induced by the most recent wave of centralization reforms. Using procurement data on all Italian public contracts awarded between 2015 and 2017, it finds that administrations expecting to lose their ability to contract independently game the centralization requirements in three ways. In the short run, they anticipate their purchases to avoid delegating to a central body. In the longer run, they both manipulate contract values, breaking down purchases into smaller lots of amounts below the thresholds driving centralization requirements, and, when given the option, aggregate into the smallest types of centralized purchasing bodies. These three distortions partially offset the potential benefits of the centralization reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Decarolis, Francesco, 2018. "Procurement Centralization in the EU: the Case of Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 12567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12567
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12567
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:11:p:3510-49 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1278-1308, September.
    3. repec:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:293-315 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017. "Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest? Evidence from Federal Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 411, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 20 Jul 2017.
    5. Gian Luigi Albano & Marco Sparro, 2010. "Flexible Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 1(2).
    6. Coviello, Decio & Mariniello, Mario, 2014. "Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 76-100.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Centralization; Procurement; Public Contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L74 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Construction

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12567. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.