Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1219
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- Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2002. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions," Departmental Working Papers 200205, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2000. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1827, Econometric Society.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
bribery; favoritism; auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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