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Citations for "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions"

by Burguet Roberto & Perry Martin K

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  1. Huang, He & Li, Zhipeng, 2015. "Procurement auctions with ex-ante endogenous bribery," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 111-117.
  2. Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2015. "“Political connections, corruption, and privatization of public services: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain”," IREA Working Papers 201515, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2015.
  3. Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications 13, Sciences Po.
  4. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2003. "Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market," Working Papers 74, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1488, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," Working Papers 355, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2012. "The Value of a Right of First Refusal Clause in a Procurement First-Price Auction," Working Papers 2012-03, CRESE.
  8. Laurent Lamy, 2005. "The ‘Shill Bidding Effect’ Versus the ‘Linkage Principle’," Working Papers 2005-35, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  9. Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
  10. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 645-657, August.
  11. PICARD, Pierre & RUSLI, Ridwan D., 2012. "State owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2012047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
  13. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
  14. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2010. "Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1872-1892, October.
  15. Roberto Burguet, 2015. "Procurement Design with Corruption," Working Papers 798, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  16. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
  17. Shingal, ANIRUDH, 2011. "Foreign market access in government procurement," MPRA Paper 32814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Wambach, Achim & Gretschko, Vitali, 2013. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79774, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  19. Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 2001. "Corruption and auctions," Microeconomics 0105002, EconWPA.
  20. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
  21. Karl Hackenbrack & Mikhael Shor, 2012. "Auditor Preference," Working papers 2012-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  22. Koc, Sevket Alper & Neilson, William S., 2008. "Interim bribery in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 238-241, May.
  23. McAdams, David & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Who pays when auction rules are bent?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1144-1157, October.
  24. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January.
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