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Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions


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Cited by:

  1. Roberto Burguet & Juan José Ganuza & José Garcia Montalvo, 2016. "The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research," Economics Working Papers 1525, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January.
  3. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009. "Preferred suppliers in auction markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295.
  4. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 39, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
  6. Anirudh Shingal, 2015. "Econometric Analyses of Home Bias in Government Procurement," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 188-219, February.
  7. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
  8. repec:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:315-41 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
  10. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 645-657, August.
  11. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
  12. Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2ck6as9uec9, Sciences Po.
  13. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2010. "Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1872-1892, October.
  14. Olga Chiappinelli, 2016. "Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1607, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  15. Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-058, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  16. Shinya Horie, 2017. "Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption," Discussion Papers 1710, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  17. Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2012. "The Value of a Right of First Refusal Clause in a Procurement First-Price Auction," Working Papers 2012-03, CRESE.
  18. Karl Hackenbrack & Mikhael Shor, 2012. "Auditor Preference," Working papers 2012-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  19. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
  20. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
  21. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
  22. McAdams, David & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Who pays when auction rules are bent?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1144-1157, October.
  23. Pierre M. Picard & Ridwan D. Rusli, 2012. "State Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare," CREA Discussion Paper Series 12-10, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  24. Shingal, ANIRUDH, 2011. "Foreign market access in government procurement," MPRA Paper 32814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Kirkegaard Rene, 2008. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, September.
  26. Koc, Sevket Alper & Neilson, William S., 2008. "Interim bribery in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 238-241, May.
  27. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2016. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," MPRA Paper 73487, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2003. "Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market," Working Papers 74, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  29. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1488, CESifo Group Munich.
  30. Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2015. "“Political connections, corruption, and privatization of public services: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain”," IREA Working Papers 201515, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2015.
  31. Roberto Burguet, 2017. "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 315-341, May.
  32. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," CESifo Working Paper Series 4045, CESifo Group Munich.
  33. Huang, He & Li, Zhipeng, 2015. "Procurement auctions with ex-ante endogenous bribery," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 111-117.
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