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Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions

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  • Lengwiler, Yvan
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

Abstract

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 39, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    2. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 645-657, August.
    3. Burguet Roberto & Perry Martin K, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, June.
    4. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
    5. Benny Moldovanu & Manfred Tietzel, 1998. "Goethe's Second-Price Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 854-859, August.
    6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
    9. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1994. "Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 339-346, May.
    10. Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Seminar Papers 731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    2. Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "Procurement of Goods and Services – Scope and Government," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 93, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Shinya Horie, 2017. "Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption," Discussion Papers 1710, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    4. Maria M. Wihardja, 2010. "Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions: Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, And Empirical Study," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 35-57, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; procurement; corruption; right of first refusal; numerical;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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