Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions
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Volume (Year): 22 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1+2 ()
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"Auctions and corruption,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
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- Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-142, February.
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- Grosskopf, Brit & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 176-204, January.
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- Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 283-287, April.
- Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
- Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
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