Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions
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- Compte, O. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. & Verdier, T., 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions," DELTA Working Papers 2000-01, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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- Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
- Lee, Joon-Suk, 2008. "Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1407-1424, November.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, 2011. "Legal Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 195-219, July.
More about this item
KeywordsAuction Procedures; Collusion; Controls; Corruption;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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