Procurement of Goods and Services â€“ Scope and Government
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|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
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- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008.
"Properties of scoring auctions,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85.
- Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2004. "Properties of Scoring Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of Scoring Auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/172674, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Properties of Scoring Auctions," Working Papers 06-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging â€“ An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1488, CESifo Group Munich.
- Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2004. "Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1315, CESifo Group Munich.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Steven Tadelis, 2009. "Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 372-399, October.
- Patrick Bajari & Robert McMillan & Steven Tadelis, "undated". "Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 02007, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Patrick Bajari & Robert S. McMillan & Steve Tadelis, 2003. "Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 9757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 39, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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