Corruption in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106187
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Cited by:
- Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023. "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
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Keywords
Auctions; Asymmetric bidders; Corruption; Multidimensional procurement;All these keywords.
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