Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees
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More about this item
KeywordsMergers and Acquisitions; Bargaining; Outside Option; Termination Fees; Break-Up Fees; Lockups;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-05-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-05-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2007-05-19 (Law & Economics)
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