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Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

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  • Povel, Paul
  • Singh, Rajdeep

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  • Povel, Paul & Singh, Rajdeep, 2004. "Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 17-20, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:84:y:2004:i:1:p:17-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. S. Rosenkranz & U. Weitzel, 2005. "Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions," Working Papers 05-32, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "Optimal takeover contests with toeholds," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    3. Loyola, Gino, 2007. "How to sell to buyers with crossholdings," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075025, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. U. Weitzel & S. Rosenkranz, 2007. "Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees," Working Papers 07-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    5. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.

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