IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v7y2007i1n19.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Hopkins Ed

    (University of Edinburgh)

  • Kornienko Tatiana

    (University of Stirling)

Abstract

This paper analyses comparative statics for first price auctions and all pay auctions with independent private values. In all pay auctions, bidders with low values will respond to a stochastically higher (in the sense of likelihood ratio dominance) distribution of types by playing less aggressively while high value bidders bid more. In the first price auction, a similar change results in all types playing more aggressively. Furthermore, we show that a decrease in dispersion of values, in the sense of a refinement of second order stochastic dominance, although also associated with an increase in competitiveness, may in addition result in less aggressive play by bidders with high values in both auction forms. We also find similar considerations in an oligopoly game with incomplete information: stochastically lower costs can lead to higher prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Hopkins Ed & Kornienko Tatiana, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:19
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1366
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1366
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1935-1704.1366?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2014. "On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-40.
    2. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
    3. Ed Hopkins, 2007. "Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 173, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. de Castro, Luciano I. & de Frutos, María-Angeles, 2010. "How to translate results from auctions to procurements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 115-118, February.
    5. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "All-pay-all aspects of political decision making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 73-90, October.
    6. Kirkegaard Rene, 2008. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, September.
    7. Ersin Körpeoğlu & Soo-Haeng Cho, 2018. "Incentives in Contests with Heterogeneous Solvers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2709-2715, June.
    8. Costas Roumanias, 2008. "Auctioning Public Office," Discussion Paper Series 2008_08, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Sep 2008.
    9. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.