Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions
A new method is proposed for the analysis of first price and all pay auctions, where bidding functions are written not as functions of values but as functions of the rank or quantile of the bidder’s value in the distribution from which it was drawn. This method gives new results in both symmetric and asymmetric cases with independent values. It is shown that under this new method if one bidder has a stochastically higher distribution of values then her bidding function in terms of rank will always be higher than her rival’s. This is a clearer result under weaker conditions than using standard methods. We also look at auctions where one bidder has more precise information than the other.
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- Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
- Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
- Hopkins Ed & Kornienko Tatiana, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, May.
- Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
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