How to translate results from auctions to procurements
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References listed on IDEAS
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
- Spulber, Daniel F, 1995. "Bertrand Competition When Rivals' Costs Are Unknown," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-11, March.
- Hopkins Ed & Kornienko Tatiana, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- De Chiara, Alessandro, 2015. "Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project," MPRA Paper 72108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Apr 2015.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017.
"Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112903, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 27, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Working Papers 15-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsProcurement Reverse auctions Linkage principle Affiliation;
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