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Breaking and entering’ of contracts as a matter of bargaining power and exclusivity clauses

Listed author(s):
  • S. Rosenkranz
  • G.U. Weitzel

We analyze the effect of liquidated damage rules in exclusive contracts that are negotiated in a sequential bargaining process between one seller and two buyers with endogenous outside options. We show that assumptions on the distribution of bargaining power influence the size of the payment of damages and determine which contractual party benefits from including liquidated damage rules. Furthermore, we show that the effect of the payment of damages on the efficiency of the consummated deals depends on the possibility to sign more than one contract. Only if this is not possible, damage rules may prevent the breaking and entering of contracts and thus lead to inefficient deals in the market of corporate control, or allow for ‘naked’ exclusion in the context of supplier contracts with externalities.

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Paper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-06.

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Date of creation: 2011
Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:1106
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