The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Renegotiation Breakdown
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-015-9451-6
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More about this item
Keywords
Exclusive dealing; Renegotiation breakdown; Foreclosure; Relationship-specific investment; D43; L10; L42;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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