Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power
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- Abito, Jose Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2008. "Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 227-246, January.
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- Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
- Lee, Sang-Ho & Matsumura, Toshihiro & Park, Chul-Hi, 2017. "Procurement of Advanced Technology and Welfare-Reducing Vertical Integration," MPRA Paper 79109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2018. "Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition," ISER Discussion Paper 1021, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
More about this item
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-10-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-10-02 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2016-10-02 (Microeconomics)
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