Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.
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- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization,
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
- Yong, Jong-Say, 1996. "Excluding Capacity-Constrained Entrants through Exclusive Dealing: Theory and an Application to Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 115-129, June.
- Joseph Farrell, 2005. "Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing," Industrial Organization 0504017, EconWPA.
- Farrell, Joseph, 2005. "Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9wv3k43c, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Lars Persson, 2009. "ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 785-811, December.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
- Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-1145, December.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Thomas Rønde, 2012. "Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 599-608, December.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Thomas Ronde, 2011. "Exclusive dealing: investment promotion may facilitate inefficient foreclosure," Working Papers 393, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Aghadadashli, Hamid & Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 291-294.
- Aghadadashli, Hamid & Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices," DICE Discussion Papers 224, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf.
- Abito, Jose Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2008. "Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 227-246, January.
- John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2007. "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1305-1320, September.
- Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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