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Excluding Capacity-Constrained Entrants through Exclusive Dealing: Theory and an Application to Ocean Shipping

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  • Yong, Jong-Say

Abstract

This paper considers the competitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts in a three-player game: an incumbent, an entrant who is more efficient but capacity constrained, and a buyer. The author shows that exclusive dealing contracts may represent an effective entry barrier--the incumbent is able to exclude the smaller entrant from the industry. The outcome is not socially efficient. The author then examines the ocean shipping market, where exclusive dealing contracts are a common practice and capacity consideration is important. He finds exclusive dealing contracts in liner shipping may have given linear conferences an unfair advantage. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Yong, Jong-Say, 1996. "Excluding Capacity-Constrained Entrants through Exclusive Dealing: Theory and an Application to Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 115-129, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:44:y:1996:i:2:p:115-29
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    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Defending home against giants: Exclusive dealing as a survival strategy for local firms," ISER Discussion Paper 1122, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2017. "Exclusive contracts and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-3.
    3. Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis, 2001. "Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2018. "Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition," ISER Discussion Paper 1021, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Lease or sale: When a durable goods monopolist can choose supply chain's openness," ISER Discussion Paper 1127, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    6. Fung, Michael K. & Cheng, Leonard K. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The impact of terminal handling charges on overall shipping charges: an empirical study," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 703-716, October.
    7. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2020. "Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
    9. Cullinane, Kevin, 2004. "7. The Container Shipping Industry And The Impact Of China'S Accession To The Wto," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 221-245, January.
    10. Gavin, Sebnem & Ross, Thomas W., 2018. "Long-term contracts as barriers to entry with differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 514-537.
    11. Mike Fusillo, 2013. "The Stability of Market Shares in Liner Shipping," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(1), pages 85-106, February.
    12. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    13. Stephen Martin, 2012. "Market Structure and Market Performance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(2), pages 87-108, March.
    14. Ke Liu & Xiaoxuan Meng, 2021. "Exclusive dealing when upstream displacement is possible," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 830-843, November.
    15. Pedro L. Marín & Richard Sicotte, 2003. "Exclusive Contracts And Market Power: Evidence From Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 193-214, June.
    16. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2018. "Price-cost tests and loyalty discounts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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