Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Frago Kourandi & Jan Krämer & Tommaso Valletti, 2015. "Net Neutrality, Exclusivity Contracts, and Internet Fragmentation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 320-338, June.
- Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2016.
"Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-222, August.
- Reisinger, Markus & Ambrus, Attila & Calvano, Emilio, 2013. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79912, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2014. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," CSEF Working Papers 378, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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- Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2013. "Piracy in a two-sided software market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 78-89.
- Rodrigo Montes & Wilfried Sand-Zantman & Tommaso Valletti, 2015. "The Value of Personal Information in Markets with Endogenous Privacy," CEIS Research Paper 352, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 Aug 2015.
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More about this item
Keywordsexclusive contracts; platforms; two-sided markets; ripple effect; content providers; market power;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2019-03-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2019-03-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-CUL-2019-03-18 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2019-03-18 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-IND-2019-03-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2019-03-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PAY-2019-03-18 (Payment Systems & Financial Technology)
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