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Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming?

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  • Paul Belleflamme
  • Martin Peitz

Abstract

Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If initially both sides of platform singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This in not always true, as the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2018. "Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_001, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2019. "Price disclosure by two-sided platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    2. Juan Manuel Sanchez‐Cartas & Gonzalo León, 2021. "Multisided Platforms And Markets: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 452-487, April.
    3. Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    5. Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2019. "Managing competition on a two‐sided platform," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 5-22, January.
    6. Benedict J. Drasch & Gilbert Fridgen & Tobias Manner-Romberg & Fenja M. Nolting & Sven Radszuwill, 2020. "The token’s secret: the two-faced financial incentive of the token economy," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 30(3), pages 557-567, September.
    7. Leonardo Madio & Carroni, Elias & Shekhar, Shiva, 2019. "Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not?," 2019 Papers pma2756, Job Market Papers.
    8. Kim Huynh & Gradon Nicholls & Oleksandr Shcherbakov, 2022. "Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets for Payments: Consumer Awareness and the Welfare Cost of the Interchange Fee," Staff Working Papers 22-15, Bank of Canada.
    9. Mo, Dong & Yu, Jingru & Chen, Xiqun Michael, 2020. "Modeling and managing heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms with government subsidies on electric vehicles," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 447-472.
    10. Eric Darmon & Thomas Le Texier & Zhiwen Li & Thierry Pénard, 2019. "Multimarket Contact and Platform Competition: Reassessing the Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2019-07, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    11. Shekhar, Shiva, 2020. "Zero Pricing Platform Competition," MPRA Paper 99364, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Xie, Jiaping & Zhu, Weijun & Wei, Lihong & Liang, Ling, 2021. "Platform competition with partial multi-homing: When both same-side and cross-side network effects exist," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    13. Siciliani, Paolo & Giovannetti, Emanuele, 2019. "Platform competition and incumbency advantage under heterogeneous switching cost — exploring the impact of data portability," Bank of England working papers 839, Bank of England.
    14. Guangyu Cao & Ginger Zhe Jin & Xi Weng & Li‐An Zhou, 2021. "Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 778-814, December.
    15. Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2020. "Platform Competition with Multihoming on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5599-5607, December.
    16. Basaure, Arturo & Vesselkov, Alexandr & Töyli, Juuso, 2020. "Internet of things (IoT) platform competition: Consumer switching versus provider multihoming," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 90.
    17. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2021. "Exclusive contracts and multihoming agents in two-sided markets," MPRA Paper 110070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    19. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Mark J. Tremblay, 2020. "Platform Competition With Endogenous Homing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1281-1305, August.
    20. Wang, Hai & Yang, Hai, 2019. "Ridesourcing systems: A framework and review," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 122-155.
    21. Calvano, Emilio & Polo, Michele, 2021. "Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets: A survey," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    22. Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2019. "Focality advantage in platform competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 49-59, January.
    23. Jean-Marc Zogheib & Marc Bourreau, 2021. "Privacy, Competition, and Multi-Homing," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-15, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    24. Johannes Johnen & Robert Somogyi, 2019. "Deceptive Products on Platforms," Working Papers 19-13, NET Institute.
    25. Fuyuki Saruta, 2022. "Exclusive Contracts and Multihoming Agents in Two-sided Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-26, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network effects; two-sided markets; platform competition; competitive bottleneck; multihoming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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