Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Aguiar, Luis & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2022.
"Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2021. "Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts," PSE Working Papers halshs-03110851, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2022. "Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03673238, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2021. "Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts," Working Papers halshs-03110851, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2022. "Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts," Post-Print halshs-03673238, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013.
"The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Post-Print hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002.
"Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 605-629, Winter.
- Gagnepain, P. & Ivaldi, M., 1999. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: the Case of Public Transit Systems in France," Papers 99.515, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," Post-Print hal-00622846, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 1999. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," IDEI Working Papers 84, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013.
"The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Post-Print hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021.
"Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre Boyer, 2016. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," Working Papers 2016-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Aguiar, Luis & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2022.
"Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2021. "Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts," PSE Working Papers halshs-03110851, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2022. "Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts," Post-Print halshs-03673238, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2021. "Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts," Working Papers halshs-03110851, HAL.
- Luis Aguiar & Philippe Gagnepain, 2022. "Absorptive capacity, knowledge spillovers and incentive contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03673238, HAL.
- Guillermo Díaz & Vincent Charles, 2016. "Regulatory design and technical efficiency: public transport in France," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 328-350, December.
- An, Yonghong & Hong, Shengjie & Zhang, Daiqiang, 2023. "A structural analysis of simple contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 236(2).
- Wenzheng Gao & Daiqiang Zhang & Naibao Zhao, 2021. "Uncertainty In Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1153-1197, August.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017.
"Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," Post-Print halshs-01524894, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01524894, HAL.
- Yonghong An & Daiqiang Zhang, 2018. "Simple menus of cost‐based contracts with monotone optimal effort," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 742-756, October.
- Hörcher, Daniel & Tirachini, Alejandro, 2021. "A review of public transport economics," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C).
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003.
"Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper 2003-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions," Other publications TiSEM c037828e-dcce-4af4-9125-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2015. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," Working Papers 85, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005.
"Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.
- BASSANINI, Anna & POUYET, Jérôme, 2002. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pouyet, Jérôme & Bassanini, Anna, 2003. "Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anna Bassanini & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries," Working Papers 2004-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Avenali, Alessandro & Catalano, Giuseppe & D'Alfonso, Tiziana & Matteucci, Giorgio, 2020. "The allocation of national public resources in the Italian local public bus transport sector," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- ,, 2011.
"Manipulative auction design,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Manipulative Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001547, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," Post-Print halshs-00754541, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754541, HAL.
- Lamy, Laurent, 2012.
"The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
- Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Post-Print halshs-00754606, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754606, HAL.
- Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.
- Robert Kleinberg & Bo Waggoner & E. Glen Weyl, 2016. "Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search," Papers 1603.07682, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2016.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2011.
"First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 108-111.
- François Maréchal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2011. "First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk," Post-Print hal-01313412, HAL.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Burguet, Roberto, 2008.
"Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo-Dutch auction meets another simple alternative,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 730-745, May.
- Helmuts Äzacis & Roberto Burguet, 2005. "Incumbency and Entry in Licence Auctions: The Anglo-Dutch Auctions Meets other Simple Alternatives," Working Papers 223, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Burguet, Roberto, 2005. "Incumbency and Entry in License Auctions: The Anglo-Dutch Auction Meets Other Simple Alternatives," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Axel Gautier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2013.
"Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector,"
Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 4(1).
- GAUTIER, Axel & YVRANDE-BILLON, Anne, 2008. "Contract renewal as an incentive device. An application to the French urban public transport sector," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2008068, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Axel Gautier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2013. "Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device: An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052683, HAL.
- Axel Gautier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2008. "Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector," CREPP Working Papers 0805, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
- Axel Gautier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2013. "Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device: An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector," Post-Print hal-01052683, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Bidding Markets; Market Sharing; Collusion; Innovation; Public Transport;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2025-04-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2025-04-21 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2025-04-21 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-REG-2025-04-21 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRE-2025-04-21 (Transport Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:130478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.