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Entry barriers in public procurement: Evidence from conjoint survey experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Ari Hyytinen

    (Hanken School of Economics and Helsinki GSE)

  • Jan Jääskeläinen

    (Finnish Consumer and Competition Authority)

  • Antti Sieppi

    (Finnish Consumer and Competition Authority)

  • Vesa-Heikki Soini

    (Hanken School of Economics and University of Turku)

  • Janne Tukiainen

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

Abstract

Limited competition in public procurement remains a persistent concern, yet the reasons for low participation are not well understood. We conduct a conjoint survey experiment that targets both potential and actual bidders in Finland. We present real firms with hypothetical tender scenarios, randomly varying key attributes values, asking which tender they would enter. The time required to prepare a bid is the most significant entry barrier. Moreover, tenders evaluated solely on the lowest price, those involving cross-border participation, and higher expected competition reduce entry. Uncertainty over the number of competitors deters entry as much as for certain facing high competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ari Hyytinen & Jan Jääskeläinen & Antti Sieppi & Vesa-Heikki Soini & Janne Tukiainen, 2026. "Entry barriers in public procurement: Evidence from conjoint survey experiment," Discussion Papers 176, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp176
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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