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Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

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  • Garud Iyengar
  • Anuj Kumar

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  • Garud Iyengar & Anuj Kumar, 2008. "Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 129-154, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:129-154
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0046-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
    3. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818728, October.
    4. Mathias Dewatripont & Lars Peter Hansen & Stephen Turnovsky, 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/176002, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524131, October.
    6. Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2004. "Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach," Discussion Papers 1397, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    8. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818742, October.
    9. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524117, October.
    10. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
    11. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    12. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    13. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818735, October.
    14. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524124, October.
    15. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_524, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2014. "Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 367-391.
    3. Abdullah Dasci & Kemal Guler, 2019. "Dynamic Strategic Procurement from Capacitated Suppliers," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 28(4), pages 990-1009, April.
    4. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
    5. Chaturvedi, Aadhaar, 2015. "Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 247(3), pages 987-995.
    6. Jung, Jihyeok & Song, Chan-Oi & Lee, Deok-Joo & Yoon, Kiho, 2024. "Optimal energy procurement with long-term photovoltaic energy contracts considering generation uncertainty: A two-dimensional auction approach," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 356(C).
    7. Lu, Qihui & Chen, Xiangfeng, 2018. "Capacity expansion investment of supplier under make-to-order and make-to-stock supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 133-148.
    8. Serin, Yasemin, 2012. "A geometric representation of profits in a supply chain network," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 36-44.
    9. Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezso, 2008. "Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity," Economic Research Papers 269856, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    10. , & , & ,, 2011. "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    11. Jifeng Cao & Cheng Ma, 2022. "Procurement Strategies and Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Service Providers in a Service Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-36, July.
    12. Jihyeok Jung & Chan-Oi Song & Deok-Joo Lee & Kiho Yoon, 2024. "Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment," Papers 2402.14269, arXiv.org.
    13. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    14. Sijing Deng & Jiayan Xu, 2020. "Ex ante and Ex post Subcontracting between Two Competing Bidders," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 37(01), pages 1-22, January.
    15. Ali Ekici & Baṣak Altan & Okan Örsan Özener, 2016. "Pricing decisions in a strategic single retailer/dual suppliers setting under order size constraints," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 1887-1898, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procurement auctions; Optimal direct mechanism; Capacity constraints; Multiple sourcing; D24; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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