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English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem


  • Dubra, Juan
  • Echenique, Federico
  • Manelli, Alejandro M.


We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Suggested Citation

  • Dubra, Juan & Echenique, Federico & Manelli, Alejandro M., 2009. "English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 825-849, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:825-849

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Paul A. Samuelson, 1953. "Prices of Factors and Goods in General Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-20.
    2. Chipman, John S, 1969. "Factor Price Equalization and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 399-406, October.
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    4. Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 433-440.
    5. Ethier, Wilfred J., 1984. "Higher dimensional issues in trade theory," Handbook of International Economics,in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 131-184 Elsevier.
    6. Birulin, Oleksii & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2011. "On efficiency of the English auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1398-1417, July.
    7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    8. Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, 1941. "Protection and Real Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 58-73.
    9. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
    10. Jones, Ronald W & Mitra, Tapan, 1995. "Share Ribs and Income Distribution," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 36-52, February.
    11. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388.
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    Cited by:

    1. Beker, Victor A., 2012. "A case study on trade liberalization: Argentina in the 1990s," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-3, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    2. Carlos Casacuberta & Ianina Rossi & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "El arte y el éxito: un matrimonio incómodo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0303, Department of Economics - dECON.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    4. Birulin, Oleksii & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2011. "On efficiency of the English auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1398-1417, July.
    5. Audrey Hu & Steven A. Matthews & Liang Zou, 2015. "English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Andrés Pereyra, 2003. "Competencia en telefonía móvil en Uruguay: diseño de subastas, contratos y marco institucional," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0103, Department of Economics - dECON.
    7. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    8. Cecilia González & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "Participación femenina en el mercado de trabajo: efectos sobre la distribución del ingreso en el Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1203, Department of Economics - dECON.
    9. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
    10. Marisa Bucheli & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "El grado de conformidad con la vida: evidencia para las mujeres del Gran Montevideo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1003, Department of Economics - dECON.
    11. Echenique, Federico & Manelli, Alejandro M., 2003. "Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," Working Papers 1178, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    More about this item


    Auction theory International trade Monotone comparative statics Global univalence;

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General


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