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On Effciency of the English Auction

  • Oleksii Birulin

    ()

    (University of Sydney)

  • Sergei Izmalkov

    ()

    (New Economic School)

We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin's results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single crossing condition - a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition - and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction.

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Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0139.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0139
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  1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Robert H. Porter, 1992. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Moldovanu, Benny, 2004. "An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 54-85, July.
  6. Dubra, Juan & Echenique, Federico & Manelli, Alejandro, 2007. "English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem," MPRA Paper 8218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
  8. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
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