An ascending double auction
This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the allocations supported by a rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, this equilibrium supports allocations that are ex post efficient. We show how to construct the rational expectations equilibrium belief function from posterior beliefs at terminal information sets of the internet trading game. The mechanism is also compared to a double auction.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005.
"Internet Auctions with Many Traders,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 23 Jan 2006.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Market Power And Information Revelation In Dynamic Trading,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1279-1317, December.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Economics Working Papers 0027, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Game Theory and Information 0203005, EconWPA.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," CESifo Working Paper Series 1300, CESifo Group Munich.
- Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994.
"Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
- Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997.
"The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003.
"Efficiency of Large Double Auctions,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
666156000000000329, David K. Levine.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996.
"Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions,"
1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeroen M. Swinkels & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June.
- Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
- Gresik, Thomas A., 1991. "Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-63, October.
- Birulin, Oleksii & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2011.
"On efficiency of the English auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1398-1417, July.
- Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-678, May.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:2:p:281-306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.