Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange
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- Gary Bornstein & Ori Weisel, 2009. "Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in "Noisy" Social Exchange," Discussion Paper Series dp528, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Alessandro Bucciol & Natalia Montinari & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2014.
"It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Sorting,"
14-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(4), pages 670-693, June.
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- Patel, Amrish & Cartwright, Edward & Mark, Van Vugt, 2010. "Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity," Working Papers in Economics 451, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
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- Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2016. "Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-133.
- Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior," Working Papers 0545, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Feess, Eberhard & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 59463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordspublic-goods game; punishment; cooperation; reciprocity; experimental games;
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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