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A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games

Author

Listed:
  • Torsten Decker

    (Institute for Operations Research, Humboldt University Berlin)

  • Andreas Stiehler

    (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems)

  • Martin Strobel

    (Department of Economics and International Institute of Infonomics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands)

Abstract

One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Suggested Citation

  • Torsten Decker & Andreas Stiehler & Martin Strobel, 2003. "A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(6), pages 751-772, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:751-772
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gürerk, Özgür & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rockenbach, Bettina, 2014. "On cooperation in open communities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 220-230.
    2. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach," MPRA Paper 16923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Andreoni, James & Gee, Laura K., 2012. "Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1036-1046.
    4. Gürerk, Özgür & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rockenbach, Bettina, 2009. "Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas," IZA Discussion Papers 4643, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Laura K. Gee & Xinxin Lyu & Heather Urry, 2017. "Anger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, January.
    6. Stephan Kroll & Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren, 2007. "Voting, Punishment, And Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 557-570, July.
    7. Kube, Sebastian & Schaube, Sebastian & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Khachatryan, Elina, 2015. "Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 248-268.

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