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A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games

Listed author(s):
  • Torsten Decker

    (Institute for Operations Research, Humboldt University Berlin)

  • Andreas Stiehler

    (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems)

  • Martin Strobel

    (Department of Economics and International Institute of Infonomics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands)

One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

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Article provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Volume (Year): 47 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 751-772

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:751-772
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