Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (404) 965-1555
Fax: (404) 965-1556
Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=112055
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006.
"Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Decker,Torsten & Stiehler,Andreas & Strobel,Martin, 2002.
"A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study,"
020, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Decker, Torsten & Stiehler, Andreas & Strobel, Martin, 2002. "A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: An experimental study," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2002,71, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Torsten Decker & Andreas Stiehler & Martin Strobel, 2003. "A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Mark T. Gillis & Paul L. Hettler, 2007. "Hypothetical and Real Incentives in the Ultimatum Game and Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 491-510, Fall.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:36:y:2008:i:4:p:505-518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.