Hypothetical and Real Incentives in the Ultimatum Game and Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study
In economics experiments, the use of hypothetical incentives is generally restricted to classroom examples; however hypothetical incentives have a clear cost-saving appeal. Although some published experiments have been conducted under the assumption that people act in the same manner with hypothetical incentives as with real ones, it is generally assumed that only real incentives generate economic behavior. Comparing hypothetical to real incentives, we find that in the Ultimatum Game hypothetical incentives do not consistently provide the same results as real incentives; in Andreoni’s Public Goods Game hypothetical incentives produce results that are statistically indistinguishable from those seen with real incentives.
Volume (Year): 33 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
- Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998.
"Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
344, David K. Levine.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7656, David K. Levine.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Eric Johnson & Melayne M. McInnes & E. Elisabet Rutstr�m, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 897-901, June.
- Bolle, Friedel, 1990. "High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-167, June.
- Blumenschein, Karen & Johannesson, Magnus & Blomquist, Glenn C. & Liljas, Bengt & O'Conor, Richard M., 1997. "Hypothetical versus real payments in Vickrey auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 177-180, October.
- Andreoni, James, 1993.
"An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-27, December.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
- Sefton, Martin, 1992. "Incentives in simple bargaining games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 263-276, June.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999.
"The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework,"
1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
- Cameron, Lisa A, 1999.
"Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
- Lisa Cameron, 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers 724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:491-510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.