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Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia

Author

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  • Michael Kosfeld
  • Devesh Rustagi

Abstract

We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative forest outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, and more generally the idiosyncratic but powerful roles that leaders may play, leading to substantial variation in group cooperation outcomes. (JEL C93, D03, O13, Q23)

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Kosfeld & Devesh Rustagi, 2015. "Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 747-783, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:2:p:747-83
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20120700
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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    1. Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia (AER 2015) in ReplicationWiki

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