IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-add1a10ae58d.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Larrain Aylwin, M.J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Prüfer, J.O.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from anoth
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Discussion Paper 2014-071, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-add1a10ae58d
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/4605919/2014_071.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ogilvie,Sheilagh, 2011. "Institutions and European Trade," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521764179.
    2. Pyle, William, 2006. "Resolutions, recoveries and relationships: The evolution of payment disputes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 317-337, June.
    3. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1293-1317, December.
    4. Roberta Dessí & Sheilagh Olgivie, 2003. "Social Capital and Collusion: The Case of Merchant Guilds," CESifo Working Paper Series 1037, CESifo.
    5. Doner, Richard F. & Schneider, Ben Ross, 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(3), pages 261-288, November.
    6. Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, 1999. "Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 427-450, January.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 546-579, June.
    8. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262062364, April.
    9. William Pyle, 2011. "Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 2-31.
    10. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347.
    11. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    12. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, September.
    13. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    14. Robert J. Bennett, 1998. "Business associations and their potential contribution to the competitiveness of SMEs," Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 243-260, January.
    15. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82.
    16. Xavier Vives, 1990. "Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 409-430, Autumn.
    17. Tucker Andrew, 2008. "Trade Associations as Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-28, May.
    18. Tucker, Andrew, 2008. "Trade Associations as Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, April.
    19. 岩﨑, 一郎 & Iwasaki, Ichiro & イワサキ, イチロウ, 2007. "取締役会構成とその内生性 : ロシア株式会社の実証分析, Board Formation and its Endogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    20. Jeffrey B. Nugent & Grigor. Sukiassyan, 2009. "Alternative Strategies For Firms In Oppressive And Corrupt States: Informality Or Formality Via Business Associations?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 423-439, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM 99d2d002-87d2-4d8e-b1d9-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Jens Prüfer, 2016. "Business Associations and Private Ordering," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 306-358.
    4. Sanchez-Pages Santiago & Straub Stéphane, 2010. "The Emergence of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, September.
    5. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, 2014. "On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-400.
    6. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Aldashev, Gani & Zanarone, Giorgio, 2017. "Endogenous enforcement institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 49-64.
    8. Ogilvie, Sheilagh & Carus, A.W., 2014. "Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 403-513, Elsevier.
    9. Roberta Dessì & Salvatore Piccolo, 2008. "Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital," CSEF Working Papers 202, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 12 Jul 2009.
    10. repec:zbw:bofitp:2007_018 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. William Pyle, 2007. "Organized Business, Political Regimes and Property Rights across the Russian Federation," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0703, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    12. Bruce L. Benson, 2017. "Customary commercial law, credibility, contracting, and credit in the high Middle Ages," Chapters, in: Todd J. Zywicki & Peter J. Boettke (ed.), Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, chapter 7, pages 129-177, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Edwards, Jeremy & Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2012. "What lessons for economic development can we draw from the Champagne fairs?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 131-148.
    14. Erik Lindberg, 2009. "Club goods and inefficient institutions: why Danzig and Lübeck failed in the early modern period," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(3), pages 604-628, August.
    15. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2019. "Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 169-176.
    16. Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove & Robinson, James A., 2010. "Governance and Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4597-4656, Elsevier.
    17. Dessí, Roberta & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2016. "Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 90-110.
    18. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "'Whatever Is, Is Right'?, Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe (Tawney Lecture 2006)," CESifo Working Paper Series 2066, CESifo.
    19. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2014. "The Economics of Guilds," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 169-192, Fall.
    20. Ma, Guangrong & Rui, Oliver Meng & Wu, Yiping, 2015. "A springboard into politics: Do Chinese entrepreneurs benefit from joining the government-controlled business associations?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 166-183.
    21. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Who will monitor the monitors? Informal law enforcement and collusion at Champagne," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 261-277.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business Associations; Trade associations; Professional organizations ; Guilds; Lobbying; Private Ordering; Endogenous institutions; Quality of Legal Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-add1a10ae58d. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.