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External Relationship of Russian Corporations

Author

Listed:
  • Avdasheva, Svetlana
  • Golikova, Victoria
  • Sugiura, Fumikazu
  • Yakovlev, Andrei

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdasheva, Svetlana & Golikova, Victoria & Sugiura, Fumikazu & Yakovlev, Andrei, 2007. "External Relationship of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:b37
    as

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    File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/13465/1/DPb37.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    2. Andrei Yakovlev, 2004. "Evolution of corporate governance in Russia: government policy vs. real incentives of economic agents," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 387-403.
    3. T. Dolgopyatova, 2001. "Models and Mechanisms of Corporate Control in the Russian Industry (Some Empirical Evidence)," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    4. Luc Moers, 2000. "Determinants of Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: Description of a Survey in Russian Industry," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 307-335.
    5. Timothy Frye, 2005. "Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence From a Survey Experiment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp801, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. S. Avdasheva., 2004. "Business-groups in Russian industries," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    7. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga & Pirttilä, Jukka & Solanko, Laura & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    8. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
    9. Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga, 2006. "Lobbying at the local level : social assets in Russian firms," BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    10. Andrei Shumilov & Natalya Volchkova, 2004. "Russian business groups: substitutes for missing institutions?," Working Papers w0050, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    11. Solanko, Laura, 2006. "Coping with missing public infrastructure : an analysis of Russian industrial enterprices," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    12. V. Mau., 2002. "Post-communist Russia in Post-industrial World: Problems of Catching-up Development," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 7.
    13. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:58:y:2006:i:7:p:1033-1056 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yakovlev, Andrei & Govorun, Andrei, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," IWH Discussion Papers 16/2011, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    2. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Discussion Paper 2014-043, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    4. Pyle, William & Solanko, Laura, 2010. "The composition and interests of Russia's business lobbies : A test of Olson's "encompassing organization" hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    5. Pyle, William, 2007. "Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation," BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2007, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stock holding company group; corporate governance; firm's boundaries; enterprise associations; institutions; state authorities; Russia; corporate finance; banking sector; ownership structure; corporate performance; managerial turnover;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • P39 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Other
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • P43 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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