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取締役会構成とその内生性 : ロシア株式会社の実証分析, Board Formation and its Endogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of Russian Corporations

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  • 岩﨑, 一郎

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  • 岩﨑, 一郎, 2007. "取締役会構成とその内生性 : ロシア株式会社の実証分析, Board Formation and its Endogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:b37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. T. Dolgopyatova, 2001. "Models and Mechanisms of Corporate Control in the Russian Industry (Some Empirical Evidence)," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    2. Luc Moers, 2000. "Determinants of Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: Description of a Survey in Russian Industry," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 307-335.
    3. Timothy Frye, 2005. "Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence From a Survey Experiment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp801, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga & Pirttilä, Jukka & Solanko, Laura & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    5. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
    6. Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga, 2006. "Lobbying at the local level : social assets in Russian firms," BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    7. Andrei Shumilov & Natalya Volchkova, 2004. "Russian business groups: substitutes for missing institutions?," Working Papers w0050, New Economic School (NES).
    8. Solanko, Laura, 2006. "Coping with missing public infrastructure : an analysis of Russian industrial enterprices," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    9. V. Mau., 2002. "Post-communist Russia in Post-industrial World: Problems of Catching-up Development," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 7.
    10. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    11. Andrei Yakovlev, 2004. "Evolution of corporate governance in Russia: government policy vs. real incentives of economic agents," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 387-403.
    12. S. Avdasheva., 2004. "Business-groups in Russian industries," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    13. Andrei Yakovlev, 2006. "The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture?," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(7), pages 1033-1056.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yakovlev, Andrei & Govorun, Andrei, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," IWH Discussion Papers 16/2011, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    2. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM 99d2d002-87d2-4d8e-b1d9-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    4. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Discussion Paper 2014-071, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Pyle, William & Solanko, Laura, 2010. "The composition and interests of Russia's business lobbies : A test of Olson's "encompassing organization" hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    6. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Pyle, William, 2007. "Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation," BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2007, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

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    Keywords

    Russia; board formation; endogeneity; agency theory; bargaining hypothesis;
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