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Firms And Public Service Provision In Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Pertti Haaparanta

    (Helsinki School of Economics)

  • Tuuli Juurikkala

    (Helsinki School of Economics)

  • Olga Lazareva

    (CEFIR)

  • Jukka Pirttila

    (Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT))

  • Laura Solanko

    (Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT))

  • Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

    (New Economic School/CEFIR and CERP)

Abstract

This paper reports first results from a survey of 404 middle-sized and large manufacturing firms from 40 Russian regions in April-June 2003. We examine the extent of social service and infrastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ assessment of the quality of public infrastructure and the regulatory environment. Background information of ownership, investment, performance, competition, and finance decisions of the firms is also gathered. The data reveal that despite major divestments of social services during 1990s, a great majority of firms still provide at least some form of social services. For example, 56% of the firms have their own housing or support local housing, and 73% of the firms have recreation facilities or support employee’s recreation activities. While managers view the social service provision as non-essential and costly, many of the firms continue to provide these services, even to users other than their own workforce. The quality of public infrastructure is generally assessed as being good or satisfactory; the respondents were the least satisfied with the quality of roads. Over a half of the firms provide their own heat, but mainly due to technological reasons – although public service interruptions do occur – and 24% of the firms give support to the maintenance and construction of public road network. The regulatory burden the firms face continues to be severe. In more than half of the firms, for example, the general manager has to spend more than two weeks in negotiations about public infrastructure with the authorities. These descriptive results indicate that there is still a lot scope for improvement in the quality and quantity of public service provision in Russia. Enterprises are still engaged rather heavily in social service provision, road network would require improvements, and the easing of regulatory burden should continue. Addressing these questions is likely to be vital for the sustainability of investments and growth in Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Pertti Haaparanta & Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva & Jukka Pirttila & Laura Solanko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Firms And Public Service Provision In Russia," Working Papers w0041, New Economic School (NES).
  • Handle: RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Lobbying at the local level: social assets in Russian firms," Working Papers w0061, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," Working Papers w0062, New Economic School (NES).
    3. Leppänen, Simo & Linden, Mikael & Solanko, Laura, 2012. "Firms, public good provision and institutional uncertainty: Evidence from Russia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 522-530.
    4. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2012. "Non‐wage benefits, costs of turnover and labour attachment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 20(1), pages 113-136, January.
    5. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2005. "Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 19(2), pages 175-202.
    6. Korppoo, Anna & Korobova, Nina, 2012. "Modernizing residential heating in Russia: End-use practices, legal developments, and future prospects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 213-220.
    7. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli, 2007. "Bribes and local fiscal autonomy in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    8. Solanko, Laura, 2006. "Essays on Russia's economic transition," Scientific Monographs, Bank of Finland, number 2006_036.
    9. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Springer Books, in: Robert W. McGee (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, chapter 32, pages 315-349, Springer.
    10. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2005. "Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 175-202.
    11. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli, 2007. "Bribes and local fiscal autonomy in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    12. Sokolov, Vladimir & Solanko, Laura, 2016. "Political influence, firm performance and survival," BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2016, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    13. Solanko, Laura, 2006. "Coping with missing public infrastructure: an analysis of Russian industrial enterprices," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2006, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    14. Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2006, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    15. Solanko, Laura, 2006. "Essays on Russia's economic transition," Bank of Finland Scientific Monographs, Bank of Finland, volume 0, number sm2006_036, December.
    16. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2004. "To Divest or not to Divest? Social Assets in Russian Firms," ERSA conference papers ersa04p637, European Regional Science Association.
    17. Pertti Haaparanta & Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva & Jukka Pirttila & Laura Solanko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Firms And Public Service Provision In Russia," Working Papers w0041, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    18. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Golikova, Victoria & 杉浦, 史和 & スギウラ, フミカズ & Sugiura, Fumikazu & Yakovlev, Andrei, 2007. "External Relationship of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    19. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," Working Papers w0062, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles

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