Fiscal federalist relations in Russia: a case for subnational autonomy
In a federation as large and diverse as Russia, the policies of regional and local governments play a key role in determining economic outcomes. The state of intergovernmental and fiscal federalist relations directly affects the nature of these policies. Several existing studies highlight common problems in the conduct of regional and local state organs in Russia as key obstacles to the improvement of the business and investment climate. In this light, since early 1998, the Economics Department of the OECD has been carrying out special work on fiscal federalism and regional finance in the Russian Federation as part of a programme of the OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members (CCNM). This work has involved the close co-operation of the Russian government, especially the Ministry of Finance, 10 representative Subjects of the Federation, and a number of local administrations during 1998-2000. The primary objectives have been a better understanding of problems in budgetary finance at the subnational level, the motivations behind regional and local economic policies, and the implications for reform of fiscal federalist relations.
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