Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia
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Other versions of this item:
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia," NBER Working Papers 7616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style,"
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- Zhuravskaya Ekatherina, 2000. "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style," EERC Working Paper Series 99-15e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
- Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Working Papers w0001, New Economic School (NES).
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"Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives,"
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- Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997.
"The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
- P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
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