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Bargaining: separately or together?

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  • Alp Atakan

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Alp Atakan, 2008. "Bargaining: separately or together?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 295-319, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2008:i:4:p:295-319 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0037-0
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-007-0037-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 408-419.
    2. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    3. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 408-419.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dana, James D., 2012. "Buyer groups as strategic commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 470-485.
    2. Galasso, Alberto, 2010. "Over-confidence may reduce negotiation delay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 716-733, December.
    3. Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.
    4. Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Tangsangasaksri, Supanit, 2011. "Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 55-64, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Unions; Coalition formation; Hold-up; C73; C78; D7;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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