Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
This paper examines three types of contracts in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (such as Shapley value). An exclusive contract delays the contribution of the excluded player j until the arrival of the excluding player i. It is profitable when j is complementary to other players in the absence of i. An inclusive contract brings the included player j forward to player i's arrival. It is profitable when j is substitutable to other players in the presence of i. Finally, a collusive contract between i and j can be modeled as a proxy agreement under which i always brings j with him. The profit from collusion therefore equals to the sum of profits from exclusion and inclusion. It is positive when i reduces the complementarity between j and the other players.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Legros, Patrick, 1987.
"Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 30-49, June.
- Patrick Legros, 1987. "Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: the case of the nucleolus," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7046, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Guesnerie Roger, 1976.
"Monopoly, syndicate and shapley value : about some conjectures,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1977. "Monopoly, syndicate, and shapley value: About some conjectures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 235-251, August.
- Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994.
"Renegotiation design with unverifiable information,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March.
- Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Scholarly Articles 12375014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
- Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-97, June.
- Haller, Hans, 1994. "Collusion Properties of Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-81.
- Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410, July.
- Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1973. "Disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-11, February.
- Robert J. Weber, 1977.
"Probabilistic Values for Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Christopher M. Snyder, 1996. "A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 747-769, Winter.
- Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0738. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.